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1. A Puzzle on the Interpretation of Scalar Quantifiers and Numerals 
 
Numeral determiners (such as two, three etc.) and scalar quantifiers (such as 
some) are known to have different interpretations. Under one interpretation, two 
and some have an upper bounded1 or strong meaning, where two means 'two and 
not more' (or 'exactly two') and some means 'some but not all'. Alternately these 
words can be interpreted with a lower bounded or weak meaning, where two 
means 'at least two' (or 'two or more') and some means 'at least some' (or 'some 
and possibly all'). For example, consider the following dialogue in which speaker 
(A) interrogates speaker (B) about the quantity of cupcakes eaten by Alan.  
 
(1) (Speaker A) a.  How many of the cupcakes did Alan eat? 
 (Speaker B) b.  He ate some (of the cupcakes). 
 (Speaker B) c.  He ate two (of the cupcakes). 
 
(1a,b) are false - or seriously misleading - if uttered in a situation where Alan ate 
all or three cupcakes. Thus (1) exemplifies a communicative situation in which 
some and two are given upper bounded interpretations. Contrast this with the 
dialog in (2). 
 
(2) (Speaker A) a.  Who ate some/two cupcakes? 
 (Speaker B) b.  Alan did (eat some/two of the cupcakes). 
 
Here, (2b) appears to be true - or at least felicitous - if uttered in a situation where 
Alan ate all/three cupcakes. The sentence in (2) is an example of a situation where 
two and some are likely to be assigned a lower bounded meaning. The key point 
here is that the same sentence with a different background generates different 
interpretations of two and some. How do these interpretations come about? 
 In the next paragraph we will review some previous accounts that address 
this old puzzle by attributing scalar implicature to strengthening. Then, we will 
consider some recent experimental data which raise questions about this account 
of the interpretation of numeral and scalar quantifiers. Finally, we will introduce 
an experimental study designed to address these questions and we will discuss the 
results in light of different linguistic models of the meaning of scalar items. 
                                                         
1 See Horn (1972), who first introduced this terminology. 
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2. The Theory of Scalar Implicatures and Interactions with Quantifiers and 
Numerals 
 
Perhaps the most influential account of these phenomena stems from Grice’s 
seminal work on the pragmatics of human communication and linguistic behavior 
(Grice, 1967). This has been further developed by Neogricean theorists (Horn, 
1972, 2004; Levinson, 2000; Gazdar, 1979, among others). Under this framework 
the literal (i.e. basic) meaning of some is the lower bounded one while the upper 
bounded reading arises through a Scalar Implicature (henceforth SI). The SI is a 
pragmatic inference prompted by a particular class of linguistic items which 
activate alternative items which can be arranged in an ordinal relationship along a 
scale (scalar items). Some, for instance, activates the alternative quantity all.   The 
scalar term and its alternatives form an asymetrical entailment scale (<some, all>) 
where each element entails (i.e. logically implicates) the elements to the left, and 
is entailed by elements to the right. This property holds for other scalar domains 
such as connectives (<or, and>), modals (<may, must>), adverbs (<sometimes, 
always>) and so on (see Levinson, 2000, for an overview).  
 The pragmatic process that gives rise to SIs is grounded in the Gricean 
Maxim of Quantity ("make your contribution as informative as is required, and 
don't make it more informative than is required"). Here is a sketch of how it 
works. When a speaker utters a sentence containing a weak element of an 
asymmetric entailing scale (such as some in 3a), the hearer infers that the speaker 
was not in the position to utter a parallel sentence containing a stronger element of 
the scale (i.e. all in 3b).  
 
(3) a.  Alan ate some of the cupcakes 
 b.  Alan ate all of the cupcakes 
 c.  Alan ate some of the cupcakes, but he did not eat all of them. 
 
Hence from the Maxim of Quantity - and the assumption that the speaker is 
cooperative - the hearer infers that (3b) does not hold. As a result, the meaning 
conveyed by the utterance is the conjunction of what has been said (3a) and what 
is implicated, namely the negation of (3b), which ends up being (3c). 
 The Neogricean account of scalar implicature can be extended to 
numerals.  On this hypothesis numbers have ‘weak’ meanings which are subject 
to the same entailment relations that hold between other scalar items. A numeral 
like two is a weak element of an asymmetric entailment scale, namely, the number 
scale <1, 2, 3, 4...>, hence it should also generate SIs2. According to this proposal, 
the upper bounded or 'exact' meaning of numerals is attributable to a SI which 
arises from the same processes that provide the upper bound for other scalar terms 
such as some (compare 3a-c and 4a-c). 
                                                         
2 this was first noted by Horn (1972, 1989), who argued, however, in a more recent paper 
(Horn, 2004) that numerals are ambiguous among three possible readings, namely 'at least N', 'at 
most N', and 'exactly N'. Cf. also Carston (1998) for a similar proposal. 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(4) a.  Alan ate two of the cupcakes 
 b.  Alan ate three of the cupcakes 
 c.  Alan ate two of the cupcakes, but he did not eat three (or more). 
 
 
3. Polarity and SIs 
 
Curiously, the interpretation of scalar terms is sensitive to the polarity of the 
context in which they occur. Intuitively, in Downward Entailing (DE) contexts the 
lower bounded reading of scalar items seems to be more salient, whereas in 
Upward Entailing contexts (UE) the upper bounded meaning seems to be more 
readily available. A DE context can be defined as a linguistic environment that 
licenses inferences from a set to its proper subset. UE contexts, on the other hand, 
license inferences from sets to supersets3. The following examples illustrate this 
apparent generalization.  
 
(5) a.  Alan missed some/two exercises and he will flunk out. 
 b.  Alan missed some/two exercises but not all/more and he will flunk out. 
(6) a.  If Alan missed some/two exercises, he will flunk out. 
 b.  If Alan missed some/two exercises but not all/more, he will flunk out. 
 
Some and two in (5a) are embedded in a UE context, and they seem to be 
interpreted with their upper bounded reading (as paraphrased in 5b). In (6a), on 
the other hand, they occur in the antecedent of a conditional, which is a DE 
context, and their meaning is more compatible with the lower bounded reading 
(namely, even if Alan missed all/three or more exercises he will flunk out), and 
thus they do not appear to get the interpretation spelled out in (6b). The 
systematicity of these intuitions have received different explanations under 
different theories of implicature4. Panizza, Chierchia and Clifton (in press) 
conducted two experiments to test whether the interpretation and processing of 
numerals is affected by polarity. In the first experiment they presented subjects 
with sentences such as (7a,b) and asked them to report their intuitions about the 
meaning of the numeral. 
 
(7) a.  John has two cars in the garage and he will park a motorcycle in the    
     courtyard.                                                         
3 Examples of DE contexts are the antecedent of conditionals, the restriction of universal 
quantifiers, the scope of negation or negative predicates, questions etc. (see Chierchia, 2004 for an 
overview).  
4 Gazdar (1979), proposed that SIs are blocked under negation, while Horn maintained that 
under negation weak items (e.g. some) become strong (not some, which means no) and thus they 
do not generate any SI. Chierchia (2004) put forward an algorithm in which the polarity is checked 
locally (i.e. within the scope of the scalar trigger) and if the SI, generated locally, does not lead to 
a stronger statement (strength condition) it gets canceled. This theory has the advantage of 
predicting that weak scalar items should not generate SIs when they occur under the scope of any 
DE operator. 
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 b.  If John has two cars in the garage, he will park a motorcycle in the    
      courtyard. 
 
Subjects were asked to select one of two options ("the speaker is talking about 
exactly two cars” or “the speaker is talking about at least two cars"). The results 
showed that when the numeral was embedded in a DE context (as in 7b) it 
received an upper bounded reading less often than when it occurred in a UE 
context (as in 7a, 49% vs. 78% upper bounded interpretations).  
Second, in an eye-tracking experiment, subjects were given both these sentences 
and versions of the same sentences in which the interpretation of the numeral 
(two) was strongly biased to the upper bounded reading by material in the second 
clause (8a and b). 
 
(8) a.  John has two cars in the garage and he will park a third car in the    
      courtyard. 
 b.  If John has two cars in the garage, he will park a third car in the         
      courtyard. 
 
The authors found that, when the continuation was neutral, participants made 
more regressive eye movements toward the numeral (two) embedded in a UE 
context (7a) than in a DE one (7b). However, when the continuation was biased to 
an exact, upper bounded reading, the numeral in a DE context (8b) received more 
regressions than one embedded in a UE context (8a).   
This gave rise to a significant interaction in the second-pass reading times 
between polarity (UE vs. DE) and type of continuation (neutral vs. biased). This 
interaction was explained in the following terms. When participants were reading 
the first clause, they were more likely to give the numeral an upper bounded 
interpretation in UE contexts than in DE contexts.  When the continuation was 
neutral there was no reason to revise this interpretation. However, when the 
continuation presupposed that the numeral had an exact, upper bounded 
interpretation (as in 8a,b), this conflicted with the lower-bounded interpretation 
favored by the DE contexts (as in 8b).  As a result, subjects often had to return to 
the first clause to re-read and reanalyze the numeral. Thus the findings from these 
two experiments demonstrate that the polarity affects both the off-line 
interpretation and on-line processing of numerals, in a fashion which suggests that 
they are subject to scalar strengthening. 
 
 
4. Divergences between Scalar Quantifiers and Numerals 
 
In the previous paragraphs we have seen that there are compelling reasons for 
thinking that scalar quantifiers like some and numerals are subject to the same 
mechanism of scalar strengthening. However, there is also evidence both in the 
linguistic and in the psycholinguistic literature that some and numerals behave 
differently with respect to their interpretation. Horn (1989), for instance, pointed 
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out that numerals display a different behavior when embedded under negation. 
Let us consider the following sentences. 
 
(9) John didn't grade SOME of his assignments. He graded ALL of them. 
(10) John didn't meet Mary OR Sue. He met both of them. 
 
In the examples above the strong meaning of some and or - which is argued to be 
strengthened towards the exclusive reading (A or B but not both) through SI - is 
explicitly denied, and the continuation asserts that the truth of the stronger item of 
the scale holds (namely all and and are the stronger scale-mates of some and or 
respectively). This phenomenon, known as implicature cancelation, has been 
argued to involve a special type of negation called metalinguistic negation (Horn, 
1989).  In fact in (9) and (10), some and or are typed in boldface to mark the focal 
phonological contour accompanying this words when their corresponding SI is 
canceled under negation. If these sentences are produced with no phonological 
marking of the weak scalar term, they are ungrammatical or strongly deviant. In 
contrast, the upper bounded meaning of a numeral is denied more easily and does 
not require focal stress (11). 
 
(11) John did not grade three papers. He graded five. 
 
 Another piece of evidence that numerals and some achieve their upper 
bound in different ways comes from a recent experimental study by Huang and 
Snedeker (2009) using the visual-world paradigm. Subjects were presented with 
scenarios in which a pair of boys and a pair of girls received two different sets of 
objects (e.g. socks and soccer balls). Participants listened to instructions which 
asked them to select one of the characters while their eye movements to the 
display were monitored. The critical trials displayed a girl who had two out of the 
four socks that were present in the scenario, and another girl with three out of the 
three soccerballs. Participants were told to "Pick up the girl with some/two of the 
socks". Notice that there is a temporary ambiguity at the onset of 'some': on its 
lower bounded interpretation (i.e. 'some and maybe all') the instruction could 
potentially refer to either, the girl with a subset of socks or the girl with the total 
set of soccer balls. Similarly, if numbers are truly scalar terms, this ambiguity 
would also be present for the two trials; both the girl with two socks and the girl 
with three soccer balls have ‘at least two’ objects and hence, in the absence of a 
scalar implicature, both are potential referents. In addition, Huang and Snedeker 
included sentences in which the referent was disambiguated by the semantic 
lower bound of the numeral or scalar quantifier (i.e. "Pick up the girl that has 
three/all of the soccer balls"). Under these circumstances, participants rapidly 
used the meaning of the quantifier to disambiguate reference, developing a 
preference for the correct character 200-400ms after quantifier onset. In contrast, 
when they heard the sentences with some, subjects did not shift their gaze to the 
correct referent until about 800 ms after the quantifier (at roughly the same time 
the noun was disambiguated). Critically, on the two trials, disambiguation was as 
rapid as it was for all and three, suggesting that the upper bound for numbers was 
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available as quickly as their semantically encoded lower bound, The authors 
interpreted the results in terms of a fast, immediate, access to the 'exact' reading of 
two, in contrast with a slower, delayed, access to the upper bounded meaning of 
some. Numerals are thereby argued to have an 'exact' semantics, while some 
receives its upper bounded meaning through a SI, which is costly in term of 
processing. 
 Note that the linguistic and experimental facts we have just reviewed pose 
several new puzzles about the meaning of scalar quantifiers and numerals. First, if 
numerals have an 'exact' semantics, how is their 'at least' interpretation derived? 
Second, how do we explain the apparent similarity of behavior of numerals and 
scalar quantifiers in UE vs. DE contexts? Finally, how can we reconcile the 
experimental findings by Panizza et al. (in press) vs. Huang and Snedeker (2009)? 
To address these questions we conducted an experimental study on numerals and 
scalar quantifiers that we will describe in the next paragraph. In this study we 
employed the visual world paradigm, which can provide precise information 
about how people’s interpretation of words and sentences evolves over time. Our 
experimental design went beyond the previous studies in two critical respects.   
First, in contrast with Huang and Snedeker (2009), we manipulated the polarity of 
the context containing the quantifiers.  Second, in contrast with Panizza et al. (in 
press), we tested scalar quantifiers in addition to numerals, so we could directly 
compare them.  
 
 
5. An Experimental Study on Scalar Quantifiers and Numerals. 
 
5.1 Procedure 
 
The aim of this study is to test the off-line interpretation and on-line processing of 
numerals and scalar quantifiers with respect to the polarity of the context in which 
they are embedded. To do this, we employed the visual world paradigm, where 
subjects hear sentences while they are attending to a visual scenario and their eye 
movements are recorded. In our experiment, which builds on Huang and Snedeker 
(2009), we tested 64 undergraduate students in the following procedure. Subjects 
were told that they would be playing a game involving a cook and a teacher. The 
cook was looking for a child to help in the kitchen. On each trial, the teacher (who 
did not appear in the visual scenario) would tell a story about the four children.  
Then the cook, who could not hear the story, would ask the participant to help 
find one of the children. If the subject could help the cook find the boy or the girl 
that he was looking for, then s/he should do so. But if there was no such person, 
then the subject could reject the sentence by clicking on a marked box.  
  
5.2 Materials and Design 
 
Half of the subjects were presented with 32 sentences in which the quantifier 
(either a numeral or a scalar quantifier) appeared in a UE context. These were 
declarative clauses (such as 12). The other half of the subjects heard 32 sentences 
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in which the quantifier appeared in the antecedent of a conditional (13) and hence 
appeared in a DE context. Thus the polarity of the embedding context was 
manipulated between-subjects. 
 
(12) I know what's going on. 
 A boy has some/all/two/three of the paperclips. Point to him. 
(13) I don't know what's going on but.. 
 If a boy has some/all/three of the paperclips, then point to him.  
 
Notice that UE and DE conditions differ minimally from each other. In the former 
ones the Cook thinks he knows what's going on while in the latter conditions he 
does not. The only further difference in the experimental sentences is the presence 
of "if" in the DE conditions, at the beginning of the sentence, and the presence of 
"then" at the beginning of the second one. All the other words, as well as all the 
scenarios, were exactly the same. The type (scalar vs. numeral, e.g., some vs. two) 
and the strength (weak vs. strong, e.g., some vs. all) of the quantifier was 
manipulated within-subjects, which means that each subject heard 8 sentences for 
each of the four quantifiers that we used (two, three, some and all).  
 As anticipated earlier, we are primarily interested in three questions: (1) 
what are the mechanisms by which upper bounded interpretations emerge over 
time, (2) are these mechanisms different for numeral and scalar quantifiers, and 
(3) how these mechanisms are influenced by the polarity of the context. To pursue 
this goal, half of our trials were ones in which the visual context provided a good 
referent for upper bounded interpretation of the quantifier and this object was 
ultimately the one referred to. These scenarios are similar to those used by Huang 
and Snedeker (2009).  In this study, we will call these conditions the go trials.  
Here participants are always expected to select the same referent (to “go”); the 
only question is how quickly they are able to do this. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Displays used for the some and two go trials. 
 
For example, after hearing the story while looking at the scene in Fig. 1, the 
subjects were asked to point to the boy that has some/two of the paperclips (see 
examples 12 and 13), who is the dark-haired boy in the top-left quadrant. 
Critically, however, in the some and two conditions unambiguous identification of 
the target is not possible until either the upper bound is accessed or the subjects 
hear the disambiguation of the noun (i.e. "...clips"). Thus a reliable preference for 
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the target boy (relative to the other boy) after the quantifier (some/two of the 
paper...) but before the disambiguation point (...clips) would suggest calculation 
or retrieval of the upper bound. In contrast in the all and three conditions, the 
referent is semantically disambiguated by the quantifier (e.g.  in Fig.1, 
participants would be asked to point at the boy with all/three of the paperweights). 
These trials demonstrate how quickly semantic information can be used to restrict 
reference in this task and serve as a useful point of reference for interpreting 
behavior in the some and two conditions . 
 The other half of the trials constituted the no-go conditions. In these trials, 
the scenario did not include a referent that was consistent with the strengthened or 
upper bounded interpretation of the quantifier.  In the case of the strong quantifier 
conditions (sentences with all and three), there was simply no person who 
matched the description. In the case of the weak quantifier conditions (sentences 
with some and two), there was a referent that matched the description under its 
lower bounded interpretation. For example in Fig. 2 subjects were asked to look 
for the boy with some/two paperclips.  If they interpreted the quantifier as having 
no upper bound, they could choose the dark-haired boy in the top-left corner, who 
has all/three paperclips. However, if they had adopted an upper bounded 
interpretation of some and two (i.e. 'some but not all' and 'two but not more', 
respectively) they would have to reject the statement.  
 In the UE conditions, the rejection option was "the cook is wrong" while 
in the DE conditions it was "there is none". Thus the all and three trials in both 
the go/no-go conditions and UE/DE conditions, allowed us to verify that subjects 
understood the experimental sentences, were able to use them to guide eye 
movements and could perform the task correctly. 
  
Figure 2.  Displays used for the some and two no-go trials 
 
5.3  Experimental Predictions 
 
This experiment permitted us to address two issues about the interpretation of 
scalar quantifiers and numerals. First, the participants’ decisions in the no-go 
trials allowed us to assess how polarity affects the ultimate interpretation of 
utterances containing some and two. On these trials participants who had a lower 
bounded interpretation of the utterance would presumably select the character 
who matched this description but violated the strengthened meaning. In contrast, 
those who had an upper bounded interpretation of the utterance would be 
expected to select the rejection box (indicating that there was no referent for the 
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phrase).  If the upper bounded meaning of numerals and scalar quantifiers is 
controlled by a SI-sensitive mechanism, SIs should be discouraged in DE contexts 
but encouraged in the UE contexts. This should lead to higher acceptance rate in 
DE conditions relative to the UE conditions.   
 Our analyses of online processing focus on the go trials where the target 
matches the utterance both under both the weak and the strong interpretation of 
the quantifier. Here, we may draw the following predictions. First, irrespective of 
polarity, if the basic meaning of two includes a semantic upper bound and the 
meaning of some does not, then we would expect rapid disambiguation for two in 
the go trials, but slower disambiguation for some. Second, if the polarity of the 
context influences the probability of calculating the implicature, then we should 
see differences between the UE and DE conditions for some.  Furthermore if the 
mechanisms underlie polarity effects are the same for numeral and scalar 
quantifier, then we would expect to see similar differences between UE and DE 
contexts for both the some and two trials. For example, since UE contexts are 
more likely to give rise to strengthened readings, we might expect more rapid 
disambiguation for both some and two in the UE contexts, and prolonged 
competition between referents in the DE contexts.   
Recall that Huang and Snedeker found that the upper bound of two 
restricted reference as rapidly as the lower bound of three in a UE context.  One 
possible interpretation of these findings is that SIs for numbers are incredibly 
rapid because the scale is over practiced and highly salient (see Barner & 
Bachrach, in press).  If this is the case, we might expect two to pattern differently 
from strong quantifiers in DE contexts in which SI’s are typically absent. In 
contrast if the rapid disambiguation of two, reflects its lexical properties this early 
disambiguation should persist regardless of polarity.  
  
5.4 Off-line results 
 
Unsurprisingly, in the go trials participants' accepted virtually all of the sentences, 
while in the no-go trials for all and three, they consistently rejected the sentences. 
These results suggest that participants understood the task, performed it correctly, 
and were able to understand both the UE and DE sentences. 
 The no-go trials for some and two were the primary focus of our offline 
analyses. Here we found the predicted effect of polarity: participants accepted the 
target more often in the DE conditions than in the UE ones, both for some (74% 
UE vs. 93% DE) and for two trials (11% UE vs. 40% DE). Thus the polarity of 
the context in which the quantifier is embedded influences both some and two, 
and does so to roughly the same degree (no significant interaction was found 
between polarity and type of quantifier). Nevertheless, two was strengthened very 
often whereas some received an upper bounded interpretation far less frequently. 
This asymmetry is consistent with the hypothesis that there are lexical differences 
between numerals and scalar quantifiers. For example, two, unlike some, could 
have a lexically encoded upper bound (an 'exact' semantics). We explore this 
possibility further in our analyses of participants’ eye movements. 
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5.5 On-line results (broad time-window analysis) 
 
Our analysis of fixation patterns focused on the go trials. For each time window, 
we computed target preference: the time spent fixating the target (the referent of 
the description) as a proportion of the total time spent in fixating both the target 
and the distractor (the person of the same gender as the target). When target 
preference equals 1, it means that the subject is looking only at the target.  When 
it equals 0, then the subject is only looking at the distractor. The early part of the 
sentence (e.g. "a boy has...") allows the participants to focus in on target and 
distractor character but provides no additional information, thus the target 
proportion should hover near 0.5 in this time window. After quantifier onset, we 
would expect target proportion to increase sharply for the strong quantifiers.  As 
we noted earlier, for some and two, the latency before this rise in target preference 
indexes the amount of time required to interpret the quantifier with an upper 
bounded meaning. 
 Analyses were conducted on the target preference scores for two broad 
time-windows of 1.1 seconds each corresponding to the quantifier ("some/two of 
the paper...") and the disambiguation ("...clips").  First, we found that the target 
preference scores for the quantifier region were well above chance for three and 
all, demonstrating that our participants were able to rapidly use the meaning of 
the quantifiers to restrict reference. Second, target preference scores in the 
quantifier window were also well above chance for two, both in the UE and DE 
conditions, suggesting that participants had very fast access to the 'exact' or  upper 
bounded meaning of two.  In contrast, target preference scores for some remained 
at chance in this time window, rising only after participants heard the 
disambiguating noun. This suggests that subjects did not compute a SI to restrict 
reference prior to the disambiguation. These results replicate what was found by 
Huang and Snedeker (2009) and suggest that some and two diverge strongly with 
respect to their initial interpretation, with two having an immediate upper bounded 
interpretation. 
 The effects of polarity emerged later, for both the some and two trials. On 
the some trials,  the target proportion during the disambiguation window was 
significantly higher in the DE condition than in the UE one. This result is quite 
surprising for two reasons. First if the UE context promotes implicature, then we 
would have expected more growth in target preference in this context, not less. 
Second, in both UE and DE contexts the target is unambiguous at this point, thus 
it is unclear why polarity should continue to have any effect on reference 
restriction. Interestingly, we found precisely the opposite effect for two. In this 
case, participants had developed a rapid target preference during the quantifier 
window with no difference between the UE and DE conditions. However during 
the disambiguation time window, target preference grew more rapidly in the UE 
condition than the DE condition. The time course of these effects is explored in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
5.6 On-line results (fine grained time-windows analysis) 
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In this analysis we divided the presentation time of the sentence (5 seconds) into 
50 regions of 100 ms each. This analysis had two goals. First we wanted to rule 
out the possibility that were early differences between the UE and DE contexts 
that had disappeared when averaged in our broad time windows.  Second, we 
wanted to gain a clearer understanding of the timing of the polarity effects that 
emerged in the disambiguation window. Fig. 3 graphs the target proportion for 
some and two sentences in the UE and DE contexts.  
 
 
Figure 3: Target Preference in Eye Movements for Some and Two trials 
 
 In the some go conditions, participants did not disambiguate the target 
until they got to the disambiguation point and there was no reliable difference 
between the UE and DE conditions before this point (the differences visible in the 
graph were not significant). However at the disambiguation point the UE and DE 
contexts diverge: in the DE contexts the preference for the target (the boy with 
some of the paperclips) becomes reliable at 400ms after the disambiguation while 
in the UE condition this preference is delayed by about 200ms. 
 What could possibly account for this delay? One possibility is that this 
delay reflects processing costs associated with implicature. Prior studies suggest 
that SI calculation is often a slow and costly process (Bott and Noveck, 2004). 
Additional data from Huang and Snedeker (under review) demonstrate that 
participants in visual world studies may begin calculating the SI for some within 
1000 ms of quantifier onset. Thus on some trials participants may have been hard 
at work calculating the implicature at the moment that the disambiguating 
phonological information arrived, leaving them less able to use this information to 
disambiguate reference.  Because SIs are more common in UE contexts, this 
should occur more often in the UE condition than in the DE condition resulting in 
a slower growth in target preference.   
  In the two go trials, on the other hand, the data pattern is quite different. 
In both UE and DE contexts participants converge on the target shortly after the 
onset of the quantifier. In the DE trials however there is a sudden decrease in 
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target preference caused by shifts back to the distractor which begins roughly 
800ms after the onset of the quantifier but 300ms before phonological 
disambiguation. In the UE two go trials this pattern is highly attenuated, if not 
absent.  
 The polarity effect in the two go trials is open to several interpretations. 
The first and most straightforward possibility is that in the DE context, 
participants who initially interpreted the number as upper bounded revise this 
interpretation after they integrate the number into the context and adopt the lower 
bounded reading with leads them to consider the distractor (i.e. the boy with three 
paperweights) as a possible referent. On this interpretation, we would conclude 
that this contextual integration begins about 600-800ms after quantifier onset and 
well after the 'exact' reading allows participants to map the quantifier to sets in the 
display. Second, the polarity effect in the DE context could be explained in a way 
that parallels our explanation for the polarity effect in the some condition.  
Perhaps in the DE contexts, participants are engaged in a costly pragmatic 
analysis which limits the resources available for identifying the referent of the 
phrase or making use of the disambiguating phonological information. We discuss 
this possibility in section 6.2.   
 Taking stock, these results confirm previous findings on the interpretation 
of scalar quantifiers and numerals. On the one hand, some is different from two, in 
that the former only receives an upper bounded reading after considerable delay 
and through a process which is apparently effortful. In contrast, two is 
immediately interpreted with an upper-bound that is  semantically specified. On 
the other hand, some is similar to two, in that they are both affected by the polarity 
(UE vs. DE) of the context embedding the quantifier. 
 
 
6. Optimizing Informativeness During Processing. Possible Solutions to the 
Puzzle. 
 
Let us go back to the questions we raised in Section 4: How is the 'at least' 
interpretation of numerals derived? How do we explain the apparent similarity of 
behavior of numerals and scalar quantifiers in UE vs. DE contexts? In this section 
we describe two theoretical models that might account for the results of the 
present experiment and provide meaningful answers to those questions. 
 
6.1 The grammatical view of SI 
 
The grammatical account is grounded on a model proposed by Chierchia, Spector 
and Fox (in press), which draws on previous works by Chierchia (2004) and Fox 
(2005). According to this view, the basic meaning of numerals is adjectival and 
exact5 (14).                                                         
5 See also Ionin and Matushansky (2004), who maintain that the meaning of simple cardinals is 
adjectival, and they provide a compositional model of how they combine to generate complex cardinals. Also Landman (2003) defends the view that numerals are exact at the lexical level. 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(14) Basic meaning of numerals 
 a. The basic meaning of numerals is adjectival and exact 
 b. Logical type: <e,t> (or <<e,t>,<e,t>>) 
 c. threeADJ (x) = card(x) = 3 (the cardinality of the atoms in x is 3) 
d. i. "Those are three cats" 
     ii. λx[cat(x) ∧ three(x)](those) = [cat(those) ∧ three(those)] 
 
In this first step, the meaning of a number phrase like "three cats" is a set of cats 
that is composed by exactly three atoms. This accounts for the immediate access 
to the 'exact' interpretation of two that was found in our experiment, as well as by 
Huang and Snedeker (2009). 
 Notice that in cases like (14d.i), numerals are used with a predicative 
meaning (i.e. they are interpreted as properties) and only the 'exact' meaning is 
available. If numerals are used as arguments, like in our experiment (e.g. "a boy 
has three paperclips"), they are interpreted as quantifiers and like other 
indefinites, they are subject to existential closure (15). 
 
(15) Existential closure 
 a. Indefinites are subject to existential closure (Heim, 1982; Winter, 1989;   
     Chierchia, 2005) 
b. "Three cats are purring" 
      i. [cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)] 
      ii. ∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)] (∃-closure) 
 
During this process, the 'at least' interpretation arises at the clausal level, as in 
(15b.ii). In fact, if there is a set of four cats that are purring in a situation s, it 
follows that there is also a set of three cats that are purring in s, which is what 
(15b.ii) means. This accounts for how 'at least' readings of numerals are derived, 
in general, and provides a theoretical explanation for the possible ‘at least’ 
reading we found in the DE condition of the two go trials (namely, the delay 
arising 600-800ms after the onset of two). Finally, SIs are obtained via 
exhaustification at Logical Form, where numerals gets again an 'exact' reading 
(16).  
 
(16) Scalar Implicatures as exhaustifications 
 a. SIs are obtained via an operator present at LF that acts like a silent    
     counterpart to ‘only.’ 
     Exh(p) = p ∧ ∀q ALT(p) [ q  p ⊆ q] 
b. Exh [∃ three cats are purring] 
 c. Exh (∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)]) 
 d. ∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)] ∧ ∀q ALT(∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧  
    purring(x)])[ q  ∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)] ⊆ q] 
 f. ∃x[cat(x) ∧ two (x) ∧ purring(x)] ⊇  ∃x[cat(x) ∧ three(x) ∧ purring(x)]  
     ⊆  ∃x[cat(x) ∧ four (x) ∧ purring(x)] 
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 g. (c) = Three cats and not more are purring = only THREE cats are       
      purring 
 
The exhaustivity operator in (16a) operates in the following way. It takes as 
argument a proposition p (the assertion). Then it says that p is true, and each 
alternative q to p which is true must be entailed by the assertion p; hence non 
entailed alternatives must be false. If we apply this to (15b.ii), as in (16c,d), we 
end up excluding any alternative stronger than p (such as "four cats are purring"), 
and we get the upper bounded interpretation spelled out in (16g). 
 This process is subject to a principle of optimization of informativeness as 
shown in 17. The effect of Optimize Informativeness (OI) is that exhaustification 
is carried through preferentially when it leads to a stronger meaning, namely in 
UE contexts. 
 
(17) Optimize informativeness 
 a. [IP …..[… A….] ….]  A is a scalar term 
 b. [IP …..Exh [… A….] ….] 
 c. Every else being equal, choose (b) iff it is stronger than (a). 
 Exh leads to a stronger sentence in UE contexts. 
 
This means that when we interpret a sentence containing a scalar term, its basic 
meaning (17a, which is 15b.ii in the previous example, viz. "at least three cats are 
purring") is compared to the same sentence to which an exhaustification operation 
has been applied (17b, which is 16d in the previous example, that is, "only three 
cats are purring"). As a result of this comparison, the stronger meaning should be 
selected - or, at least, favored - against the weaker one. This step explains why 
upper bounded readings of numerals are generated more often in UE contexts, 
compared to minimally different DE ones (this study and Panizza et al., in press). 
 One feature of our data is unexpected given this hypothesis. On the face of 
it, this account predicts that there will be an early phase in which participants 
interpret numbers as exact, then a second phase in which the at least reading is 
generated in both UE and DE contexts (after existential closure), followed by a 
third phase in which exhaustification occurs giving rise to the differences between 
UE and DE contexts.  We clearly find evidence for the first phase (the rapid 
disambiguation for two) and we see evidence that polarity has the predicted 
effects on offline judgments and online processing.  However our data provide no 
evidence for the second stage in which at least readings are generated (and 
equally so) in both UE and DE contexts.  The most straightforward explanation 
for this fact under the present hypothesis is ∃-closure is occurs quite late but is 
very fast. As a result, the time lag between the insertion of ∃ and the subsequent 
insertion of Exh is just too short to leave a trace in how the relevant sentences are 
processed. 
 
6.2 The D(omain)-Widening approach to numerals 
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The Domain-widening account6 comes in two parts. The analysis of some is the 
same as in the previous approach: its strengthening is due to a scalar implicature. 
For explicitness sake, we assume that SIs arise as exhaustifications as described in 
section 6.1. Numerals, however, work differently.  Like before, they start out with 
an exact adjectival lexical meaning.  
 
(18) Basic meaning  of numerals: same as above (14) 
 threeADJ   =  λx [card(x) = 3] 
 
The meaning in (18) is used to build predicative NPs (as in those are three cats). 
However their meaning in argument position (as in John fed three cats) is derived 
in a different manner: by turning numerals into generalized quantifiers that retain 
their original exact meaning.  
 
(19) Quantified meaning 
 a. threeD = λPλQ  [threeADJ (∪[P ∩ Q] D )] 
 b. Three cats are purring = [threeADJ (∪[CATS ∩ PURR] D )]  
= the cardinality of the sum of the set of things that are cats and purr 
 (in D) is three 
 
What (19b) describes is a situation where given a domain D, the biggest set of 
things (i.e. the supremum) that are cats and purr has cardinality three. Here the 
meaning of the constituent quantified by a numeral is still 'exact', for if in the 
domain there is a group of four individuals that are cats and purr the formula in 
(19b) ends up being false. Notice that the steps in (18) and (19) accounts for the 
immediate 'exact' interpretation given to two in our experiment. 
 The 'at least' meaning of numerals, then, is derived through an optional 
existential closure over the domain variable D as in (20).7 
 
(20) Optional domain widening 
 a. [….nD….]  ∃D [….nD….] 
 b. ∃D [three D cats are purring] 
 c. ∃D [threeADJ (∪[CATS ∩ PURR] D )]  
= there is some domain D such that the set of things that are cats and 
 purr in D is three. 
d. (19b) entails (20c) 
 
(20c) says that there is at least a domain satisfying the formula in (19b). From this 
follow that if we consider different domains containing different groups formed 
by three purring cats, we will wind up taking into account more than three cats                                                         
6 Our proposal is directly inspired by Breheny (2007). 
7 It should be noted that on the current presentation of the domain widening approach this 
operation is part of grammar: we are constructing two different logical forms for the sentence in 
question.  Pragmatics enters into determining which of the available representations is chosen on a 
given occasion. 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and thus the 'at least' reading arises. Arguably, according to this model, the 
domain widening would induce the generation of the 'at least' reading that caused 
our subjects to reconsider the "boy with three objects" when asked to point to the 
boy with "two objects" in DE contexts. 
Finally, like in the previous proposal, this process is subject to a principle of 
optimizing informativity (21), whereby the existential operator leads to a stronger 
statement in DE contexts.  
 
(21) Optimize informativeness 
 a. [IP …..[… A….] ….]  A is a scalar term 
 b. [IP …..∃ [… A….] ….]   
 c. Everything else being equal, choose (b) iff it is stronger than (a): ∃ leads  
 to a stronger statement in DE contexts 
 
Notice that, so far, both the D-widening and the exhaustivity-based approaches 
account for most of the results of our experiment, as well as for Huang and 
Snedeker (2009), even though they radically differ from each other. However, 
what they do share is that they rely on an operation that is subject to a principle of 
optimizing the informativeness. The addition of an exhaustivity operator is 
favored in UE contexts, where it leads to a stronger meaning, whereas the 
addition of an existential operator over domains is favored in DE contexts. 
 Here is how the account for the observed eye-movement patterns in the go 
trials would be accounted for under these two theories. On the D-widening 
approach, there simply is no level of representation or processing in which the UE 
utterances receive a lower bounded interpretation. Thus it is unsurprising that we 
do not find any evidence for one. Moreover, the D-widening approach allows us 
to explain the polarity effects for some and two in precisely the same way. In the 
case of some, there is an additional operation in the UE conditions 
(exhaustificaiton) which is resource intensive and slows down reference 
resolution and use of the disambiguating phonological information. Conversely, 
in the case of two, there is an additional pragmatic operation in the DE conditions 
(D-widening) which is also resource intensive and slows down the use of 
disambiguating information. 
 Let us compare this with how the explanation would go on the 
grammatical view of section 6.1. These are the candidate logical forms in the case 
of some: 
 
(22) a. i. Exh [A boy has some of the paperclips]...           (Exh) 
     = A boy has some but not all of the paperclips. Point to him. 
     ii. [A boy has some of the paperclips]...          (No Exh) 
     = A boy has some and maybe all of the paperclips. Point to him. 
 b. i. If Exh [a boy has some of the paperclips] then...   (Local Exh) 
     = If a boy has some but not all of the paperclips, then point to him. 
     ii. Exh If [a boy has some of the paperclips] then...  (Global Exh) 
     = If a boy has some and maybe all of the paperclips, then point to him. 
                iii. If [a boy has some of the paperclips] then...       (No Exh) 
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     = If a boy has some and maybe all of the paperclips, then point to him. 
 
In the UE case, Optimize informativeness leads one to prefer (22a.i) over (22a.ii). 
In the case of DE contexts, OI leads one to choose (22b.iii), where no operator is 
present. Clearly (22a.i) should be more costly than (22b.iii) since no operator is 
present in the latter. Let us contrast this with what happens with numerals. 
 
(23) a. i. Exh [A boy has two of the paperclips]...           (Exh) 
    = A boy has exactly two of the paperclips. Point to him. 
     ii. [A boy has two of the paperclips]...          (No Exh) 
    = A boy has two or more of the paperclips. Point to him. 
 b. i. If Exh [a boy has two of the paperclips] then...     (Local Exh) 
    = If a boy has exactly two of the paperclips, then point to him. 
     ii. Exh If [a boy has two of the paperclips] then...  (Global Exh) 
    = If a boy has two or more of the paperclips, then point to him. If he 
 has less than two of the paperclips, you don’t have to point to him. 
                iii. If [a boy has two of the paperclips] then...       (No Exh) 
    = If a boy has two or more of the paperclips, then point to him. 
 
Here, in UE contexts, OI leads to prefer (23a.i) over (23a.ii); in DE contexts OI 
leads to choose (23b.ii) over its competitors, for that is the logically strongest 
interpretation. Thus we see in comparing UE with DE that in both 'winning' cases 
we have an occurrence of Exh. But in the DE context, we have two sites at which 
it can be applied. We conjecture that this choice is the source of the delay in the 
DE contexts with respect to the UE in the case of numerals. 
 Obviously, further fine-grained experimentation will be needed to tease 
these two accounts apart. However notice that the logic of our second account 
reveals a potential weakness of the D-widening approach. The implicature 
generated by the LF in (23b.ii) is a so called 'indirect implicature' (cf. Chierchia, 
2004). It is unclear how such implicatures would be generated on the D-widening 
approach. To appreciate the phenomenon in its full generality, consider a further 
example. The sentence in (24a) may suggest the implicature in (24b). 
 
(24) a.  Everyone who has two cars can help us out 
 b.  Not everyone who has one car can help us out 
 
This is due to the fact that in DE context the 'standard' entailment (n entails n-1) is 
reversed (n entails n +1). Under the grammatical view of SI, this fact is readily 
exploited and the inference in (24) is derived straightforwardly by applying the 
exhaustivity operator globally, as in (23b.ii) – cf. (25a). In fact what the operator 
(Exh) does in (25a) is to deny the stronger alternatives in (25b), which entail the 
assertion (24a). Thus the result of this process (25b) is added to the meaning of 
the utterance, resulting in a strengthened proposition, that is (25d) 
 
(25) a. OALT [everyone who has two cars can help us out]  
 b. ALT(31a) = everyone who has one car.., everyone who has three cars… 
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 c. everyone who has n car can help us out ⊆ 
 everyone who has n+1 cars can help us out 
 d. everyone who has two or more cars can help us out and not everyone  
 who has one car can 
 
The existential operator over domain variables, on the other hand, would not be of 
any help in cases such as (24). The local addition of the ∃–closure operator over 
domains would yield the two or more reading; the non addition of the operator 
would lead to the exact reading. There is no way to obtain the reading in (25d), 
without introducing further apparatus. And it seems difficult to see how such an 
apparatus could differ from that of grammatical approach to SI.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, these experiments provide further evidence that numerals have an 
'exact' semantics. Unlike some they are typically strengthened in both UE and DE 
contexts, and their upper bounded meaning is immediately available. However 
numerals can get a weak, lower bounded ('at least) interpretation, which is more 
salient, or more often derived, in DE contexts. We discussed two accounts under 
which the 'at least' meaning of numerals is derived through an existential closure 
operation of a variable ranging either over pluralities (grammatical view of SI) or 
over the domain of quantification (D-Widening approach).  
 While different in some respects, scalar quantifiers and numerals clearly 
have parallel properties as well. Both are affected by the polarity of the context in 
which they are embedded. Polarity affects both the temporal dynamics of 
processing and the ultimate interpretation of the terms, as attested by the off-line 
and on-line results we discussed. To explain this fact from a psycholinguistic 
perspective, we must acknowledge that the parser has to be sensitive to a 
(economy) Principle such as Optimize Informativeness, which - under both 
accounts - is geared to maximize logical strength. That is, it favors the derivation 
of a new meaning only in cases where it leads to a stronger statement. 
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